Dillon-Watson v. State (4th Disctrict Court of Appeals, May 18th, 2011).

Facts: A Sheriff's deputy was dispatched after an anonymous call regarding a female selling drugs to her ex-boyfriend seated in a gold Maxima presently in a Wal–Mart parking lot. The deputy found a gold Maxima in the lot with a female in the driver's seat and approached the vehicle. The Defendant was seated in the car with her ex-husband. The deputy, asked what they were doing. The Defendant told him that she and her ex-husband were exchanging their child, because the parking lot was a neutral spot. There was a child in a car seat in the back. The deputy then told them about the anonymous tip, and the couple laughed. The deputy called for backup and told them, “I'd like to see your ID's and I'll just take a quick look at your vehicles and if everything checks out okay, you guys will be good to go.” Both of them provided the officer with identification. He went to the teletype and checked their backgrounds. It took between five and ten minutes to get the teletype results. When he finished, the deputy told them that “you guys came back [with no warrants].” He then said, “Let me just take a quick look at your vehicles, and then if you guys are good, you'll be on your way.” They said, “Okay, yeah, go ahead.” The deputy found drugs in a clear bag under the driver's front seat where the Defedant was seated, and she was charged with possession.  The deputy testified that he believed he was performing an investigative stop when he approached the vehicle. Because the tipster's description matched Dillon–Watson, she would not have been free to leave. If Dillon–Watson had attempted to leave the scene, he would have issued a BOLO for her. And while he could not state how Dillon–Watson expressed assent to search her vehicle, he maintained that he had consent.

The state admitted at the hearing on the motion to suppress that it could not justify an investigatory stop based upon the anonymous tip. It argued, however, that the stop constituted a consensual encounter, and Dillon–Watson consented to the search of her vehicle. The defense maintained that the stop was investigatory, and Dillon–Watson did not voluntarily consent to the search. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and the Defendant appealed.

Holding: First, the Court discussed what a "consensual encounter" is: it involves “minimal police contact.”  A citizen may either voluntarily comply with a police officer's requests or choose to ignore them.  The citizen is free to leave. On the other hand, a person is seized in the constitutional sense when, based upon all the circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. 

In this case the totality of the circumstances show that the “consent” to search the vehicle was not voluntary, if there was consent at all.  First, the deputy indentified the defendant as a possible criminal suspect.  Then, the deputy continually placed additional requests and demands on the defendant after each previous request came up negative.  Thus, the Court held that the search of the vehicle was not based upon a voluntary consent, and that the search violated the appellant's Fourth Amendment rights. The case was reverse and remand with directions to vacate the Defendant's convictions and discharge her.